ACCOUNT OF OAS ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA

Principals actions against Cuba

 

August 12 to 18, 1959. V Consultation Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers, Santiago de Chile.

The governments of Panama, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic had denounced Cuba, accusing it of interfering in their internal affairs by sending expeditionary forces to overthrow their respective governments.

These accusations, even though they didn’t have the wished for results vis-à-vis Yankee interests, among other reasons due to the rapid and efficacious way our country made its denunciations, notably through the memorable speeches made by our foreign minister Roa, still established a guideline that would be repeated in the future.

The so-called “Cuban question” would occupy, ever after, a position of priority on the OAS agenda and, according to US interests, the bases for the political-diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the activation of the ITRA to try to “legitimize” direct military aggression on Cuba were beginning to be set.

In this manner, the governments of Brazil, Chile, the United States and Peru request the calling of a Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers in order to tackle the situation existing in the Caribbean. This announcement was made according to Articles 39 and 40 in the OAS Charter.  The V Consultation Meeting took place in August 1959 in Santiago de Chile and it adopted what came to be called the Santiago Declaration. 

At that meeting even though there is no text adopted that explicitly condemns Cuba, the “conceptual framework” is created that will serve at later meetings for the purposes of Yankee policy against our country, already decided upon at that time to isolate Cuba and to prepare the conditions for military aggression.

During that V Consultation Meeting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was established and the Inter-American Peace Commission received new powers.  We must record both decisions as the creation or improvement of hemispheric mechanisms that would henceforth play a fundamental part in the application of Yankee guidelines against Cuba within the heart of the OAS.
 

August 16 to 21,1960. VI Consultation Meeting. San José, Costa Rica.

This meeting held in the capital of Costa Rica had the aim of adopting sanctions against the Trujillo dictatorship; Chancellor Raúl Roa energetically denounces US policy when he states: “If it is a matter of doing justice, we should be sanctioning Trujillo and the US government together.”

 

August 22 to 29, 1960. VII Consultation Meeting.  San José, Costa Rica.

This meeting, clearly aimed against Cuba, had been formally requested by Peru and agreed to by the Permanent Council in July of the same year.  In the agenda of that meeting, as the most relevant items dealing with our present topic, we shall underline the strengthening of continental solidarity and the Inter-American System, especially before the threats of extra-continental intervention that might affect them, inter-American cooperation for defence of the American democratic institutions against the subversive aggression of any organization, governments or their agents, and the consideration of international tensions existing in the Caribbean region in order to insure harmony, unity and peace in the Americas 

That meeting adopted several resolutions, but because of its relevance the so-called San José Declaration stands out; operative paragraphs 4 and 5 are quoted here:

Operative Paragraph 4 of the declaration points out: “…the Inter-American System is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism and democracy and will only attain the fullness of its aims on the continent when all the American republics adjust their behaviour to the principles enunciated in the Santiago de Chile Declaration.”

As for Paragraph 5, here the threat is made even more patent when it declares that “all the member states of the regional organization have the obligation to submit themselves to the discipline of the Inter-American System, voluntarily and freely come together, and that the firmest of guarantees for their political independence comes from obeying the rules in the OAS Charter.”

Even though this Meeting was conceived of to analyze the “Cuban question”, both the reasons Peru used to call it together as well as its results left no room for doubt that in San José the much anticipated “punitive” measures were not adopted against Cuba.  Instead, the necessary conditions were established, according to Yankee terms, to impose the exclusion of the government of Cuba at Punta del Este.

At the end of the Costa Rica meeting, the Mexican representative went on the record, in writing, that for his delegation the text of this declaration was not applicable to Cuba with whose process, he said, he sympathized.  Meanwhile, the Guatemalan delegate complained, also in writing, that the meeting had failed to adopt direct measures against Cuba as the country responsible for the expansion of international communism in this hemisphere.  

That meeting was the scenario for one of the most memorable diplomatic battles fought by Cuba whose delegation was headed by Chancellor Raúl Roa.  It is enough just to remember that Cuba not only contested the event’s agenda when its anti-Cuban aims were revealed, but it also proposed to replace it with another that constitutes in itself an exact and incontestable denunciation of the real situation that the organization had to confront at that time.  In this way, the Cuban proposal counterbalanced the strengthening of solidarity among the peoples of Latin America to the continuous aggressions directed against them by the US governments throughout its history, the collective defence of the Latin American peoples before the economic and military aggression of the government of the United States; it proposed a consideration of the subordination of the Latin American governments to the dictates of the US government and it demanded an analysis of the attitude of the Latin American governments before the attempts to smash the unity of Latin American peoples by means of the temporary concession of markets resulting from acts of aggression carried out against other peoples in our community, as a reprisal to their resistance to having them imposed.  As it is very well known, at the moment of announcing the decision to leave the meeting, Chancellor Roa concluded by saying: “I leave with my people, and with my people, the peoples of Latin America are also leaving.”

In response to the results of the San José Meeting, the General Assembly of the People of Cuba adopted the First Declaration of Havana which was the instrument by which it rejected the hegemonic desires of the US against Cuba.

In December of 1961, the OAS Permanent Council decided to call the VII Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the request of Colombia.  This announcement is made according to Articles 6 and 11 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA) which was indicating both the intention of considering the threats that might arise from the interventions of extra-continental powers capable of breaking up the unity of the Americas, as well as the purpose of adopting the necessary measures for maintaining regional peace and security.

 

January 22 to 31, 1962. VIII Consultation Meeting, Punta del Este, Uruguay.

This meeting was called as the ITRA Consultation Body; it had a notable anti-Communist bent and while it was on it excluded Cuba from the inter-American system, adopting a total of 9 resolutions, 4 of which referred expressly to our country, as follows:

 

1. The Offensive on Communism in America. Number 1 of this declaration established that “as the intensification of the offensive by Communist governments was noted” we remarked on “the presence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba that publicly identifies itself with the doctrine and foreign policy of the Communist powers”.

1. Resolution VI “Exclusion of the present government of Cuba from participating in the inter-American system.” We shall refer to this resolution later.  

 

1. Resolution VII “American Defence Board”. After noting in the penultimate paragraph of the Preamble that on April 26, 1961 the Board had decided that “the participation of the Cuban regime in the preparation of defence plans  is extremely prejudicial to the labours of the Board and to the security of the hemisphere”, it was decided in its only resolution paragraph “To immediately exclude the present government of Cuba from the Inter-American Defence Board until such time as the OAS Council determines by a vote of two-thirds of its membership that the participation of the government of Cuba is not detrimental to the labours of same or to the hemispheric security.”

1. Resolution VIII “Economic Relations”. Upon alleging “the intense subversive activity in America to which the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the Cuban government devote themselves”, it decided to “immediately suspend trade and the trade of weapons and implements of war of any kind with Cuba.”

 

Results of the most important votes:

The legal reasons of the resolution obtained 17 affirmative votes, 1 against and 3 abstentions.  The vote against was Cuba’s and the 3 abstentions belonged to Ecuador, Mexico and Brazil.

The first declaratory paragraph by which it was indicated that “the present government of Cuba, as a result of its repeated acts, has been placed outside of the Inter-American System”, received 20 votes in favour, including those of Mexico, Ecuador and Brazil, with the nay vote belonging to Cuba.  The second paragraph in this section of the resolution that stated that “this situation requires the most continuous of vigilance on the part of the member countries of the Organization…” got the same votes as those received on the preceding paragraph. 

Finally, the third stipulating paragraph that resolves that “this incompatibility excludes the present government of Cuba from participating in the Inter-American System”, got 14 votes in favour, one against and the abstentions of Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador.  The last and fourth stipulating paragraph that was indicating the adoption, “without delay”, of the “measures necessary to fulfil this resolution”, received the same vote as we have described above. 

The resolution as a whole was also voted on and the results were a repeat of the votes recorded in the resolution part. 

Mexico was on record that “the exclusion of a Member State is not legally possible without prior amendment to the OAS Charter according to the procedure envisaged in Article 111 of same.”

Ecuador also expressly went on record that “the exclusion of a Member State of the Inter-American System can only be made by a prior reform of the Charter…”  And the Ecuadoran representative added, when he explained his abstention regarding Resolution VIII that would suspend “immediately trade and the trade of weapons and implements of war of any kind with Cuba” that his country abstained during consideration of this text by which the “sanctions beginning with the suspension of the trade of weapons with the possibility of being extended to other articles, especially those of strategic importance, a concept which might include articles of prime necessity, the like of which the Cuban people should not be deprived of, making their present situation more serious.”

July 1964. IX Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Washington, U.S.A.

This was the last OAS meeting during which direct sanctions were adopted against Cuba.  Several quotes from the then-approved resolution will follow:

Paragraph 3 of the stipulating part resolved “to apply according to the stipulations in Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, the following measures:

1. That the governments of the American states do not maintain diplomatic or secular relations with the government of Cuba.
2. That the governments of the American states interrupt all their trade exchanges, both direct and indirect, with Cuba, with the exception of food, medicines and medical equipment which may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons.   
3. That the governments of the American states interrupt all their maritime transportation between their countries and Cuba, with the exception of necessary transportation for reasons of a humanitarian nature.”

 

As for the fourth paragraph in this same section, it resolved: 

“To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States so that by the affirmative vote of two-thirds if its members, the measures in this resolution be left without effect from the moment that the government of Cuba has ceased to constitute a danger towards peace and the security of the continent.”

Let us have a look at how the voting went on the operative part of the above-cited text, recorded on July 25, 1964.

Operative paragraph 1 which declared Cuba guilty of aggression, obtained 15 votes for, 2 against and 2 abstentions. Mexico and Uruguay voted against and Chile and Bolivia abstained.

A total of 16 countries backed the second paragraph which condemned Cuba for attacking Venezuela.  Mexico and Uruguay recorded their nay vote on this, while Bolivia abstained.

As for the third regulatory paragraph, voting recorded on section A) recorded 14 votes for, 4 against and 1 abstention.  Mexico, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia voted against and Argentina was the abstention.  Section B) of the same paragraph which ordered the interruption of all trade exchanges with Cuba obtained the same voting results as the previous section.  And section C) which ruled the interruption of all maritime transportation with Cuba, recorded 14 votes in favour, 3 against and 2 abstentions.  Mexico, Chile and Uruguay were opposed to said text while Bolivia and Argentina abstained. 

A total of 17 countries supported operative paragraph 4 of the resolution that established the procedure for the lifting of sanctions.  Mexico and Argentina abstained.

Finally, operative paragraph number 5 that threatened the use of force against Cuba in order to “prevent its continued aggressions”, recorded 15 votes in favour and the abstentions of Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay.

The entire resolution obtained 15 votes in favour, 3 against and 1 abstention.  Mexico, Chile and Uruguay voted against and the abstention corresponded to Bolivia.

Venezuela at no time voted because of its position as “plaintiff”.

For greater reference, we must point out that during the discussions taking place at that meeting both Mexico as well as Chile unsuccessfully insisted that the sanctions not have a mandatory nature.

In this way, the US extended the strict blockade that it had already been applying against Cuba on a hemispheric level.  The OAS, yet again, rubber-stamped the Yankee policy towards Cuba.  On July 26, 1964, Cuba responded to the new OAS manoeuvre with the Declaration of Santiago de Cuba.  On that occasion, the Commander in Chief pointed out: “…the countries that get involved in Cuba’s internal affairs and promote the counter-revolution have no right to complain that we are helping the revolution in those countries…”

As for the order to break off diplomatic and copular relations with Cuba, it it worth our while to remember that this decision was only applicable to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico since at that time the rest of the Latin American governments had already broken off their relations with Cuba.  This circumstance explains the position taken by those countries in the voting. 

As it is well-known, between August and September of that same year 1964, the countries mentioned above, with the exception of Mexico, break off with Cuba.

An early study drawn up by the then Department of International Bodies of our Foreign Office which had been charged with analyzing the possible application of coercive measures against Cuba by virtue of what was stipulated in the ITRA, anticipated on July 15, 1960 the illegal nature of these when it noted that “it cannot be forgotten that without prior authorization of the UN Security Council, the coercive measures of any kind that may be applied are inapplicable” using the OAS mechanisms.  That report which we consider preserves total validity maintained its opinion in the articles of the UN Charter, specifically in its Articles 53 and 103.

It is relevant to briefly remember the stipulations in the articles referred to.  Article 53 institutes that “Coercive measures will not be applied by virtue of regional treaties or by regional bodies without the authorization of the Security Council…”

As for Article 103, it states that “In the case of conflict between the obligations contracted by the members of the United Nations by virtue of this Charter and its obligations contracted by virtue of any other international covenant, the obligations imposed by this Charter will prevail.”

Even though it is not the purpose of this paper, we must remember that during the years the OAS constituted itself as the vehicle for US aggression against Cuba, our country developed an intense diplomatic body of work at the UN, including in the Security Council.

Three years later, during the XII Consultation Meeting also held in Washington between July and September of 1967, another resolution was adopted which condemned Cuba for “its reiterated acts of aggression and intervention against Venezuela, for its persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and other American states, using incitation, active and self-confessed support of armed groups and other subversive activities directed against the governments of said states.”

That meeting did not produce additional punitive measures.  By then, all of them had already been adopted.

We ought to remember that at that stage the Tricontinental Conference took place, the Machurucuto landing, the presence of Che and the Cuban internationalists in Cuba and the creation of the Latin American Solidarity Organization.

Thus concludes the process that led to the total exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American System along with the application of the hemisphere-wide blockade against it, a process that, as we have seen, begins in the very year of 1959 and which has as its crucial points the Consultation Meetings held in Santiago de Chile, San José, Punta del Este and Washington.

Exclusion, expulsion or suspension?

 

The contents of Resolution VI, adopted at Punta del Este has served for years as the “primary source” for the presentation of legal subterfuge that would like to sustain and feed the “controversy” persisting right up to today, according to which that decision does not exempt the Cuban state from fulfilling obligations contracted by virtue of the commitments taken on within the context of the Inter-American System y which the government and not the state has been excluded.

The instrument for achieving the purpose declared above has been, and continues being, the Inter-American Human Rights Court (IAHRC), created during the V Consultation Meeting when the process for excluding Cuba was initiated and whose mandate was reinforced and broadened through Resolution IX adopted at the infamous meeting in San José.

In a Note dated November 4, 1964, response to a communication from the ICHR, Chancellor Roa made our country’s position very clear, as it has been and as it is: “Cuba was arbitrarily excluded from the OAS…The OAS possesses neither legal, or factual or moral jurisdiction or competency over a state that has been illegally deprived of its rights.”

On April 6, 1965, the then chairman of the ICHR replied to Roa: “the VIII Consulting Meeting of Foreign Ministers excluded the present government of Cuba from participating in the Inter-American System.  As Your Excellency is able to observe, the exclusionary measure was directed at the current government of Cuba, not at the state of Cuba.” 

Furthermore, this interpretation was designed to cover up the illegal nature of all the resolutions approved against Cuba, even though more specifically the one excluding it which is still in force.

On that point, the reservations presented by Mexico and Ecuador at the conclusion of the examination of this matter at Punta del Este are extremely eloquent in that they very clearly indicate that, with the non-existence of a mechanism to exclude or eject a state, it could not make use of such a measure unless the Charter were to be amended.  Since that never occurred, the decision is therefore an illegal one.

Although an explanation of the use of the word “exclusion” in the Resolution of Punta del Este has been attempted, we are faced with the impossibility of applying the “expulsion” since the appropriate mechanism does not exist in the Charter to do so, such an interpretation cannot hide that the real intention was, precisely, to eject Cuba, and that this was achieved by the channel of exclusion.

Intermittently, throughout all these years, the subject has been “resuscitated” or has been “re-presented”, even though the primary essence of the postulates remains the same.  This resulted in the drawing up of seven (7) special ICHR reports on Cuba in the years 1962, 1963, 1967, 1970, 1977, 1979 and 1983.  During the decade of 1970-1980, the General Assembly considered the above-mentioned reports on three occasions.  In each case, debates resulted on the subject we are dealing with and the discussions taking place reflected serious differences of opinion. 

In 1980, during the X ordinary session of the OAS General Assembly, while the ICHR report on Cuba from the previous year was being discussed, the Commission representative tried to justify the “competency” of same in the case of Cuba by stating “Cuba continues being a member of the OAS given that at no time have the Charter denunciation mechanisms been put into operation.  The Cuban government has given no indications of its desire to leave the Organization.”

At that very session, the Mexican representative lucidly argued: “When Cuba was ejected from the Organization, illegally in the opinion of my government, since the Charter does not mention that, it stopped being a Member State.  The alleged distinction between State and Government that was put forth at the time has, for a long time now, ceased to have any value at all, on the assumption that it had any value at the start. (…)  The purely procedural circumstance of the lack of a formal denunciation of the Charter and the other instruments stemming from it ism in our opinion, insufficient since nobody has ever established the regulations for dealing with expulsions.”

In April 2003, the discussion was reopened in the face of the strong resistance proffered by a group of countries, this time the majority, in considering the condemnation of Cuba promoted by the United States.  The countries objecting to the manoeuvre argued that the OAS Permanent Council had no competency over Cuba since the Island remained excluded from the Inter-American System. 

The Aide-Mémoire of April 25, 2003, drawn up by the Under Secretary for Legal Matters at the request of the Permanent Council and entitled “The Situation of Cuba in the OAS and the Protection of Human Rights” attempts to justify the competency of the ICHR over Cuba for “the action that is being developed” by said Commission in regards to the government of Cuba.  The document in question proposes that the “Commission has maintained the exercise of its competencies regarding the fulfilment of human rights in Cuba by the drawing up of special reports on the human rights situation in that country, and through its annual reports that, as it is well known, contain observations and recommendations on all or the majority of OAS Member States.”

And it added:

“From a legal point of view, the ICHR has taken the view of continuing to look after the situation of human rights in Cuba by the fact that this country has not denounced or made the necessary steps to denounce the OAS Charter and, therefore, the Cuban state continues being obligated to respect the principles contained therein (…)”  It finally concludes:  “…it remains obvious that Cuba is a state that is bound by each of the Charter’s regulations, including those regarding the protection of human rights.”

This document whose prime intent was to “legitimize” the competency of the Permanent Council, the body on which the US was hoping to impose the failed condemnation of Cuba, stated that the Cuban State was a member of the OAS, but it avoided answering the main question which is: the illegality of Cuba’s exclusion. 

In the session of April 23rd of that year, during which the OAS Permanent Council debated the competency of that body to consider the Cuban “question”, the Colombian delegate touched a nerve when he stated: “This is what I don’t understand, how the dichotomy being made between the exclusion of the government and the OAS jurisdiction over the Cuban state, because (…) as anyone can plainly see, we could say: fine, don’t let the Cuban government but the Cuban state participate in OAS deliberations.  I don’t know what might happen in a country like Colombia where the president in the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Supreme Administrative Authority.”

The alleged dichotomy between State and Government that is nurtured and reiterated in the above mentioned Aide-Mémoire has been pursuing a clearly identified goal: to keep the so called Cuban subject registered on the OAS agenda according to the interests of US policy on Cuba, avoiding reference to the “return” because that would mean that they would first have to declare the illegal nature of the “exclusion”.

 

The Failure of Isolation: its certification and the OAS cover-up

 

The beginning of the decade of the seventies saw the beginning of the cracking of the political-diplomatic isolation imposed by the US and validated by the OAS.  Several countries in the region decided to defy said imposition and they re-established, unilaterally, their diplomatic relations with Cuba.

One must add to this that, in the international arena, tensions between the great powers of the past were waning.  Rapprochement and contacts between the US and the USSR and China were indications of this. 

The new situation affected the OAS when, already in 1970, it had to face up to the position of the government of Peru which had expressed its will to initiate actions designed to invalidate the prohibition to having diplomatic relations with Cuba.  That attitude was reinforced when, at the beginning of 1972, a communiqué from the Presidency of the Peruvian government publicly announced the intentions of Lima. 

On May 24 of that same year, the representatives of that country in the OAS formally requested holding an extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Council.  That session took place on May 31st and after the discussion about the regularization of relations between Latin America and Cuba was begun, a subject introduced by Peru, voting took place to include it on the agenda.  The results were: 14 in favour, 1 against and 8 abstentions.

Voting “aye: Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, Ecuador, Jamaica, México, Panamá, Perú, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Bolivia voted against, while Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the United States abstained.

The debates identified two clearly established trends.  The first, represented by Peru and Chile suggested “jumping over” the previously adopted OAS resolutions against Cuba bearing in mind that the international situation had changed. 

The original Peruvian draft avoided reconsideration of the sanctions recorded in the resolutions adopted in 1962 and 1964, proposing instead that each country be left free to re-establish diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. 

The only resolution paragraph of the resolution proposed by Peru said: “The Member States that so decide will normalize their relations with the Republic of Cuba, being free to do so at whatever level they deem appropriate.”

The other trend, led by the United States and joined, among others, by Brazil and Guatemala, made an out and out defence of the norms and procedures established by the OAS for the consideration of each case, as a channel to see to the defeat of the Peruvian project.  Basically, the US representation recalled the obligations contracted by virtue of the ITRA and the 1964 resolution whose text established the necessity of acting “by common accord” regarding Cuba.  As a result, the US championed respect for the commitments assumed regarding Cuba, alleging that the mentioned relaxing of the international situation had not changed the “interventionism” of Cuba in Latin America. 

Finally, the Peruvian proposal was dismissed by 13 votes in opposition.  Seven countries voted in its favour and another three abstained.  Those voting along with Peru were: Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Mexico, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  Argentina, Venezuela and Barbados abstained, and together with the United States, those opposed to the resolution were Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic.  

The defeat of the Peruvian project in the OAS neither prevented nor delayed the process of re-establishing Latin American and Caribbean relations with Cuba.  In May 1973, Argentina followed suit.  Later, Panama also broke with the prohibition.

This trend, by now irreversible, was a reason for concern.  On June 27, 1974, the foreign ministers of Venezuela and Costa Rica met.  At that meeting, the Venezuelan foreign minister had already informed his Costa Rican colleague that they should re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, but that they would want to proceed in common his Venezuelan colleague in writing on July 18 of that year.

In maintaining the Costa Rican negative to accompany the Venezuelan procedure in his letter, Gonzalo Facio pointed out that the reason for this “is based on the desire to not contribute to increasing the discredit already being suffered by the Rio Treaty.  (…)  The fact that six member countries of the OAS had relations with Cuba, in spite of the stipulation in the TIAR application through Resolution I of the IX Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers, is sufficiently serious to place the Treaty of Rio in doubt.  If now 3 or 4 more learned American governments decided to re-establish their relations with the government of Cuba with the above-mentioned Resolution I still in force, the loss of prestige would be total.”  And finally, it concluded: “Therefore, we have considered that it is indispensable to make one last effort”, assuring that two-thirds might be reached for the OAS to certify whether the Cuban government “had ceased constituting a danger to peace and security” on the continent, or not.  

Even though the assessment made by Facio depicted, almost exactly, the situation of total loss of prestige in which the new situation placed the OAS, it was clear that the aim of the manoeuvre initiated by him was headed towards reopening the “trial” against Cuba in order to place obstacles or, in their absence, to “regularize” what truly was happening outside of the inter-American organization: the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

The intent of the Costa Rican proposal motivated the indignation of those who had re-established relations with Cuba or were in the process of doing so, since it was the same as “asking for authorization” from the OAS to do what they had already decided to do in the exercise of their sovereign rights.

At any rate, in November 1974, the XIV Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Quito, called by Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela with the aim of revoking sanctions imposed on Cuba by the IX Consultation Meeting and to leave the OAS members free to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

As a necessary precedent, we must point out that the III OAS General Assembly had already expressly recognized “political pluralism” as one of the main principles of relations among the members.  This decision suggested that the OAS would begin to distance itself from the path that had governed its actions up to that moment, creating a more favourable space to discuss the partial lifting of sanctions against Cuba. 

In Quito, the two-thirds needed to revoke the 1954 sanctions were not reached

In May 1975, the ordinary OAS V General Assembly was held in Washington; during which the Report of the Special Commission to study the Inter-American System was presented and measures were proposed for its re-structuring (CEESI).  The Report in question proposed the approval for a new text for Article 17 of the ITRA, considered to be the greatest obstacle to removing sanctions against Cuba.  The new text pointed out that the vote of the absolute majority, not two-thirds, would be required (as the original version of the above-mentioned article proposed) in order to invalidate any coercive measure.

According to what was pointed out above, the General Assembly approved a resolution which, after reaffirming the principle of non-intervention established in the OAS Charter as a fundamental norm of the Inter-American System, established that “once the ITRA Reform Protocol is approved on a basis of the CEESI recommendations, it is resolved to leave invalid the regulations pertinent to the resolutions adopted to apply measures envisaged in Article 8 of the ITRA(…)”

The Conference of Plenipotentiaries for ITRA Reform that took place in July of 1975 in San José amended the above-mentioned Treaty as follows:

“The Consultation Body, other than the stipulation in the following paragraph, will adopt all its decisions or recommendations by a two-thirds vote of the Member Parties.”

“In order to invalidate the measures adopted according to Article 8, a majority vote of said States will be required.”

Also, in July of 1975 and after the Conference of Plenipotentiaries had concluded, the XVI Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers was held in the very capital of Costa Rica; it resolved:

“To solemnly reaffirm the principle of non-intervention and urge the Party States to be vigilant about its observance in the continental context…”

“To give the ITRA Party States the freedom, according to the policies and national interests of each one, to normalize or conduct their relations with the Republic of Cuba  at the level and in the manner that each State deems appropriate.”

Even though the decision adopted left invalid only one of the coercive measures adopted against Cuba during the 1964 IX Consultation Meeting, this result constituted a kind of “certification” of the Yankee defeat, a direct result of the process of re-establishing the political-diplomatic ties that had been developing on the fringes of the Organization.

Without under-estimating the impact of said decision, we must nevertheless record that the real effect of the “liberation” was limited. As we have already stated, several countries had decided to “liberate themselves” of their own accord, independently of whatever the OAS decided on this matter.  In fact, the first great wave of establishing or re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba was produced before the month of July of 1975. 

Additionally, this result facilitated an “honourable” acceptance on the part of the United States for the defeat of its policy against Cuba, since the OAS had left the prohibition without effect.  This time, the OAS served to cover ip the Yankee defeat.

We ought to point out that during the process Developer in the OAS in the mid seventies, there was a lot of debate, profusely ventilated by the press, about the initiatives that were then under way, directed both towards suspension of the sanctions as towards the re-entry or re-incorporation of Cuba into the inter-American organization.  Multiple statements by our Commander in Chief publicly affixed Cuba’s position on that detail.  On May 1st, 1973, Fidel tackled the subject extensively when he declared: “These initiatives had a positive aim, and they constituted contempt for US influence in the OAS, they constituted a rebellious gesture before the impositions of the United States, sustaining among other things, that any Latin American country had the right to establish relations with Cuba, independently of the OAS.  (…)  We are thankful to the various countries which, in a positive spirit proclaimed Cuba’s right to belong to the regional organization.  But the fact is that we neither can nor should ever return to that actual organization, to the OAS.”  And he adds: “We have to see whether a revolutionary country like Cuba, after all its long historical experience, can consider that such an institution is worthy to be part of.”  In yet another party of that speech Fidel concludes: “And today, on the First of May, we are saying that the OAS is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.  It is incompatible with the dignity of our peoples, it is incompatible with the interests of our peoples, it is incompatible with the future of Latin America.”

The Cuban head of state contrasted the OAS with an organization of Latin American and Caribbean integration that he defined:  “We are ready to belong to a regional organization that, in the first place, does not have its headquarters in Washington, but in one of the Latin American capitals.  An organization that defends the interests of the peoples of Latin America and those English-speaking peoples of the Caribbean before the imperialist aggressions, in other words, before the aggressions of the United States, and a regional organization that fights for the union of our peoples.  And within that regional organization there is no need to have the United States of America.”

 

The Report of the Inter-American Legal Committee on the Helms-Burton Act

The passing of the Helms-Burton Act quickly generated a wave of world rejection. In our region, the law was rejected right from the beginning by CARICOM and the Rio Group, among others.  Several countries initiated the process to adopt the so-called antidote laws.  

On June 4, 1996, during the XXVI OAS General Assembly the resolution Project entitled “Freedom of Trade and Investment in the Hemisphere” was presented for the consideration of the maximum authority of the Organization; it had the sponsorship of 32 countries.  The text of the resolution was requesting the consultative opinion of the Inter-American Legal Committee on the effects of the referred to law.

The resolution was passed by a vote of 23 in favour and had the abstention of the United States.  A total of 9 sponsoring countries did not participate in the vote.

On August 23 of the same year, 1996, the Inter-American Legal Committee issued a report in which it was concluded that “the basics and the eventual application of the legislation (…) do not conform to international law.”  And it added: “(…) no State can take measures that do not conform to international law without falling into responsibility.”

Subsequently, the XXVII ordinary session of the OAS General Assembly, held in Lima in 1997, approved the Report of the Inter-American Legal Committee by a resolution having the same title as that approved in Panama.  From that time on, at every new session of the Maximum authority of the OAS, a resolution is approved about freedom of trade and investment.  Although these texts maintain the legal character of the original, we go on the record that its existence therefore constitutes a challenge to the policy of the United States.

As for the United States, it rejected the capacity of the ILC to consider alleging that it is not a function of said authority to assess the right of each Member State to issue laws that judge on its benefit and safeguard its national interests.

Beyond its limitations, the consultative opinion issued by the ILC, even though it is not binding, possessed the moral value of representing a legal assessment of the Yankee legislation which it unequivocally describes as being illegal by virtue of the norms of international law and by the very OAS Charter.  Moreover, both the contents of the document in question as well as the results of the vote recorded in Panama constituted acts of regional insubordination before United States policy.  Dealing as it does with an OAS text, its relative importance is today much greater.

 

Precedents on the subject of re-entry, re-incorporation or re-admission of Cuba to the OAS 

In the foregoing section, we considered the process that concluded in 1975 with the partial “undoing” of the sanctions imposed on Cuba in 1964.  

At the end of the 1980s, some declarations made in the context of the Summits of the Permanent Consultation and Political Coordination Mechanism or the Rio Group served for the subject of Cuba’s re-entry into the hemispheric organization to once again take up a certain relevancy in the hemispheric agenda. 

During the first Summit of the above-mentioned mechanism held in Acapulco in November 1987, the heads of state of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay made public declarations underlining the convenience of Cuba’s integration into the OAS.  In a letter addressed to the heads of state participating in the above-mentioned summit on December 7, 1987, the Commander in Chief referred expressly to it when he stated: “Those manifestations, by themselves, reveal the changes that have occurred on the continent from that ill-fated day when Cuba was separated from the Organization of American States.  We think it appropriate to underline that Cuba has demonstrated its unchanging faithfulness to the principles of unity and Latin American and Caribbean integration that the Cuba Revolution, inspired by Jose Marti, has always held on to as its permanent currency.”

Here, the leader of the Cuban Revolution verified the change recorded in the region, but he underlined that Cuba has remained faithful to Latin American integration.  In other words, the call is being recognized as a manifestation of regional independence before the United States, but the re-entry of Cuba remains skilfully discarded when it is clearly indicated what the priority is for Cuba: regional integration.

 

The Rio Group and the OAS: between the collapse of socialist Europe and the neo-liberal boom in our region.

In the mid 1980s, and related to the peace efforts in Central America led by the Contadora Group made up of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama, it was decided to create a more broad based forum for regional political coordination; it was drawn up in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro.  Having a basis of principles according to the tenor of the key norms of international law and Latin American political and cultural tradition, the Group oscillated between political interference and the search for its own path, depending upon the political bent of the governments they had, at the same time as it was establishing itself as an authentically regional forum.  Its actions were sometimes concomitant with those of the OAS, but always more forcefully they presented new challenges to the discredited hemispheric organization.

In 1989 at Ica, Peru, the III Rio Group Summit took place.  The Latin American leaders who attended, for the first time ever, incorporated the following paragraph into the body of the Declaration adopted at presidential level: “We aim that the OAS should have total hemispheric representation and therefore, greater political importance.  We make a cordial call so that, at their occasion, the governments of Belize, Canada, Cuba and Guyana fully incorporate themselves into OAS work.”

The timid and almost neutral hope of the Rio Group generated some expectations and merited decisive US action headed towards putting up obstacles for any reopening of the debate on Cuba’s return to the OAS on terms that were different from the US ones.  A State Department press release conditioned the readmission of Cuba into the hemispheric organization for a time when free elections would be held, the human rights situation improved, the application of glasnost and perestroika on the Island, as well as the Cuba abandoning its interference in Central America.  The Yankee manoeuvre was effective and succeeded in avoiding analysis of the “case” in the 1989 General Assembly.

The fall of European socialism and the collapse of the USSR that followed placed Cuba into a double blockade situation.  To this, we must add the notable increase in the tension with the US during the summer of 1994 as a result of the boat-people crisis in the summer of that year. 
 
It was exactly in the middle of that international situation, characterized by the triumphal euphoria of the United States and its allies, during which the fall of the Cuban Revolution seemed inevitable, that the subject of the re-entry of our country acquired new momentum, this time subject to conditions set by the people advocating foreign interference.

The V Rio Group Presidential Summit held in Cartagena de Indias in December of 1991 issued a declaration on the “Cuban situation.”  After expressing its “willingness for full cooperation” so that our country would achieve “in effect human rights and open and free economic development”, it was declared:

“They hope that the government of Cuba reaches its political, economic and social goals that will permit that sister, noble nation to materialize those objectives as well as its long wished for re-insertion into the Inter-American System.”

Three years later, at the VIII Summit held in Brazil in 1994, that mechanism adopted a new declaration on Cuba.  Since it has a bearing on this paper, we shall quote two fragments from that declaration:

“…to avoid greater suffering in the sister nation it is essential there will be a peaceful transition towards a democratic and pluralist regime in Cuba, one that respects human rights and the freedom of opinion, in keeping with popular will.”

“…they consider that, at this critical moment, they can and should begin a constructive dialogue with Cuba that contributes to the internal process of democratizing the sister nation.  In that way, they hope for a greater Cuban rapprochement with the Latin American and Caribbean countries as well as its full re-incorporation into the hemispheric community.”

Continuing along the lines of the old regional practices, the text was repeating the same error of drawing out the guidelines or conditions that Cuba would have to fulfill in order to be reincorporated into the “hemispheric community”.  Doing so would validate the “reasons” that motivated the exclusion of the Island from the OAS since, according to the prevailing idea within the Group, a government that would need “a peaceful transition towards a democratic and pluralist regime (…) one that respects human rights was not “compatible” with the Inter-American System.

In this way, the revoking of the exclusion was subordinated to acceptance of the imposed conditions on the part of Cuba.  Not even the so-called “re-incorporation” was the central issue.  This document, reflecting a kind of capitalist “fundamentalism” that did not tolerate pluralism in international relations, placed the discussion under terms desired by the United States.

The contents of the Declaration of Cartagena had particular importance, above all, because the host of that Summit, the then president of Colombia César Gaviria would be elected a short time later as the OAS Secretary General.

Gaviria made his first speech as OAS Secretary General during the OAS General Assembly held in Haiti in 1995, an occasion that he put to good use to refer to the Cuban “question” in the following terms:

“Cuba deserves a chance from the Inter-American community. (…) If indeed it is necessary to recognize that many of the elements that could make up a solution have a bilateral dimension, when the moment arrives it will be inescapable for the Inter-American community to assume responsibilities (…) In the face of the collapse of communism nobody had any doubts about the necessity of Cuba moving forward, without a pause, in the reform of its economic and political systems.  In Cuba, a process implying greater economic freedom and a moving forward towards a pluralist system, political freedoms and respect for human rights must take place. (…)  Has not the time come for the Inter-American community to play a much more active role in this subject?   Will it not be necessary that we immediately begin internal reflection about the manner of playing a constructive role in the task of achieving greater political and economical freedom in Cuba and to begin its re-insertion into the Inter-American System?

Gaviria’s approach proposed “reopening” the “Cuban case” and its permanent “installation” in the OAS agenda, not to make amends for the historic injustice of its exclusion, but with the purpose of contributing to the “democratization” of Cuba.  The role of “coordinator” of the process was reserved for the inter-American organization. 

Cuba would have to submit to the conditions outlined in exchange for its “re-insertion” in the Inter-American System.  After all is said and done, the Secretary General seemed to suggest, the collapse of communism in Europe made such a scenario inevitable.  The essential cause of the situation that they wanted to analyze: the blockade and the US policy against Cuba was tackled indirectly, but even so, it was moved quickly to one side so as not to distract attention from the central point in this approach: Cuba was the problem to be solved.

Complementary to the above, Gaviria began to promote some actions that were leading towards fostering the “gradual” participation of Cuba in the hemispheric system.  In this regard, his ideas of incorporating out country into the hemispheric process through the promotion of confidence measures stood out, and this had the support of Canada and Brazil.  Another proposal was the eventual participation of Cuba in the hemispheric strategy for the war on drugs.  Gaviria’s theory of “gradualism” had the purpose of pulling out the so-called Cuban issue from where it was located. 

In 1998, Ricardo Santamaria who had been Gaviria’s advisor and at that time was Colombian ambassador in Havana pointed out to Cuban officials, at a date prior to the XXVIII Ordinary Session of the OAS General Assembly, that the Secretary General, in coordination with the foreign ministers of Mexico, Brazil and Canada, proposed to promote a group of actions to boost the assessment of the Cuban issue at the meeting.  According to this message, Gaviria would take advantage of the opening address to mention, in terms inoffensive to Cuba, the importance of the Organization not ignoring any longer the subject of its incorporation, taking advantage of the positive effect generated by the visit to Cuba of the Pope.  Later, Rosario Green, the foreign minister of Mexico, would propose authorizing a mandate to the Secretary General to call a group of countries, friends interested in the subject, to look for points of agreement around Cuba’s return to the organization.  Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Peru and the Caribbean countries would support the Mexican proposal.

The divorce between what was foreseen and what actually happened began right from the opening speech made by Gaviria when he stated:

“What is worth remembering today is that we remain watchful for opportunities that eventually present themselves in order to continue seeking a solution for something that now constitutes the most important political problem to be resolved in the hemisphere.  Many of us in America would like to see that formulae of diplomacy, negotiation and gradualism are applied to this problem, formulae that have been efficacious in other regions.  We always have the expectation that in the measure that tensions can be decreased, and advances are made towards greater public and economic freedoms and a greater protection of human rights on the Island, it will be possible to consider the return of Cuba to the Inter-American System.”

In contrast with Mexico and the Caribbean countries which were defending Cuba’s unconditional return to the OAS, Brazil supported the conditions that Gaviria himself had pointed out in his initial speech.  The Yankee delegation that had been prepared to confront the challenge that tackling such a subject would entail, was satisfied with supporting, with no restrictions, the summary of the debates that the then Venezuelan foreign minister, Burelli Rivas made, in the following terms:

“…have to start from a hope, from a position that the very interested country makes.(…) the ball is in its court.  We cannot admit or propose the admission of a former founding member (…), if they have not manifested their intention to return, and to return in the conditions under which one enters this Organization.”

This assessment, endorsed by the United States, “froze” the subject, placing the “problem” into the hands of the Cubans, upon whose compliance with the considerable conditions the “solution” depended.  Essentially, in order to “re-enter”, Cuba had to confront a “re-admission process”.

As result of these conclusions, the US achieved their goal of freezing the debate yet one more time.  In fact, one could notice a decline in the consideration of this subject in the years following the Caracas Assembly.  Between 1993 and 2003, in the general assemblies to follow in Guatemala, Canada, Costa Rica, Barbados and Chile, the OAS Secretary General eliminated from his inaugural speeches all mention of Cuba, thus contributing to lowering the profile of such a thorny issue.

That doesn’t mean the subject was totally silenced, but consideration of it rather became a “deliberative” matter, without any specific actions, one way or another, taking place. 

As part of the campaign against Cuba orchestrated as a result of the imprisonment of a group of counter-revolutionaries and the execution of three of the hijackers of the “Baragua”, a passenger launch, between April and May of 2003, the US unsuccessfully made an effort to bring about an anti-Cuban condemnation in the OAS Permanent Council.  During this period, three draft documents of condemnation were circulated.  The first of these corresponded to a Nicaraguan resolution sponsored by the US, Uruguay and Costa Rica.  The strong resistance that text ran up against, among most of the members, forced Nicaragua to present a draft Declaration of the President of the Council; this too fared badly before the reticence of the Guyanese ambassador himself who was at the head of the body at the time.

Finally, Canada, Chile and Uruguay placed before the consideration of the Council a draft declaration that was fulfilling the purpose of the original proposal and pulling together the points which we shall outline as follows: concern over the serious deterioration of human rights in Cuba during March and April; reiteration of the obligations in effect for the government of Cuba to respect and guarantee the rights emanating from the OAS Charter; request to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission that it continue examining the situation of human rights in Cuba and the promotion of a broad-based and constructive dialogue with Cuba in order to contribute to its integration into a democratic hemisphere.  It was precisely this proposal that was given to the consideration of the Council on May 19, 2003.  This draft wanted to reaffirm the alleged competency of the IAHRC over Cuba.

Before the evident lack of consensus and of the necessary support for approval of the text by a vote, the US opted for a variation that would allow them to show some result in terms favourable to their policy, at the same time as maintaining the subject on the Organization agenda and that would facilitate them to continue bringing to bear the necessary pressure on countries which did not accept being included on the list of those backing this initiative.  In a pre-fabricated manoeuvre, the Canadian representative announced that the original text proposed by its delegation would be changed in a declaration to the Permanent Council signed by some of its members, hastening to call them “Associate Member States”.  The procedure used was quickly questioned by Barbados, Brazil and Venezuela.   

Alter the debate ended, the Canadian representative requested that the minutes of this meeting reflect the declaration signed by 16 members of the Permanent Council: Canada, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the US, Peru, Panama, Argentina, Bahamas and Colombia.  Later, it could be confirmed that the Dominican Republic had added its signature to that list of signees.

In the substantive part of the debates, 19 speeches were made; of these 14 supported the declaration proposed by Canada or offered to do so if a way were found to overcome the procedural difficulties inherent in it, and another 5 countries voiced their objections.  Those were: Venezuela, Jamaica, Brazil, Mexico and Guatemala.  If we keep in mind that Jamaica presented the position along with CARICOM, from which Bahamas ought to be subtracted because it abandoned the Caribbean consensus, a total of 17 OAS Member States publicly manifested reservations about the proposal.  In any case, we ought to record that a majority of the countries objected to the manoeuvre. 

The procedure applied by the United States, to “record” the condemnation that never was in the OAS, because of its similarities, reminds us of the one used in the making up of the so-called “coalition” before the Iraq invasion.  The fiasco suffered by that country could be pointed to as the most obvious result coming out of that session of the Council.

Anyway, during the debates both the subjects of the “re-entry” as well as the allusions to Cuba’s “absence” were repeatedly presented, and we consider it necessary to refer to it in greater detail.  As we have already pointed out, in an effort to “make room” for the procedural objections presented by numerous representatives, the Canadian project introduced the following proposal in its paragraph No. 4:

“The Member States express their will to promote –in the framework of the Organization- actions conducive to a broad-based and constructive dialogue regarding Cuba, that could contribute to the integration of all nations a democratic hemisphere.”

We underline this paragraph keeping in mind that several countries tried to justify their support of the draft declaration presenting that it should champion “constructive dialogue” with Cuba.

The Argentine ambassador, during his appeal to remove “old wounds”, manifested about the proposed dialogue that “if we speak of human rights and democracy, we should also speak about the embargo.”

As for the US ambassador, when the readiness of his government to “join in that dialogue” was revealed, defined the sense of the paragraph in question in the following manner: “The last paragraph speaks of reconciling the relationship between the OAS and the Cuban people.”

This formulation takes up again the essence of the previous attempts to which we have been referring.  The opening of “broad-based and constructive dialogue” means reopening the trial against the political, economic and social systems of Cuba and beginning, in this manner, the process of “re-admission” in order to reintegrate our country into a “democratic hemisphere”.  Naturally, the text was omitting all mention of the US blockade and the illegal aspect of the exclusion.

However, the “conciliatory effort” did not succeed in confusing the countries objecting to it.  The Venezuelan representative declared: The OAS has two alternatives: one is to design alternatives directed to increasing tensions ands the other is to foster a climate of cooperation that is favourable to détente around Cuba.  The discussion must be a comprehensive one.  The blockade has failed and it must be suspended.”

The Brazilian ambassador declared that the Canadian declaration does not “resolve the original flaws.  This exercise is selective and politicized.  The forum is not the suitable one to use.  The Cuban government cannot present its view as the affected country.  The time has come to begin a process of global discussion to promote Cuba’s re-insertion into the hemispheric system, without any preconditions or preconceived ideas.  Cooperation and not confrontation should be our guiding lights in treating the Cuban situation.”  

The Jamaican representative read out the declaration on Cuba adopted by the foreign ministers at the VI Council Meeting for Foreign Affairs and of the Community (COFCOR).  The paragraph relative to this text presented the following: “…they determined that while the government of Cuba remains excluded from participation in the Inter-American System and from voting on OAS activities, the Organization is not the suitable forum for debating or issuing judgements about this while the government of Cuba cannot exercise its right to present its positions according to natural justice.”

The positions put forth by the participants in the debates suggested that the subject was bogged down.  To round matters of, the foreign minister of Canada, Bill Graham, stated the results of the last discussions on the Cuba “question” in the heart of the OAS and forwarded the intention of continuing the debate this subject at a later date in a speech given before the plenary of the XXXIII OAS General Assembly held in Chile between June 8th and 10th, 2003, when he expressed:

“(…) Many of my colleagues around this table do not believe that the OAS is the suitable forum to discuss Cuba.(…) We need to find a constructive and positive manner to advance this matter.  Indeed, colleagues, we opened the door for this discussion last month (…).  Whatever our different perspectives vis-à-vis the solution for a long postponed matter may be, we must do so in this, the only multilateral forum that represents the diversity of opinions in the Americas and we must find constructive forms that allow us to initiate a process (…) that brings benefits…to the Cuban people.”

Along the lines of what the Canadian foreign minister stated, the State Department announced that it would be starting informal consultations in the heart of the OAS in order to consider the “Cuban subject.”

 

The armour-plating of the Inter-American system and the perpetuation of the system of imperialist domination of the region

During the entire period in which Cuba has been excluded from the Inter-American System, some initiatives have been developed and adopted in the hemispheric context; we cannot avoid their consideration since they are connected to the subject which we have attempted to develop throughout this document.

The dedication on the part of the III OAS General Assembly, held in 1973, for “pluralism in international relations”, opened up, apparently, a new phase in OAS activities.  The partial repeal of sanctions imposed on Cuba in the middle of the 1970s, a process had been happening independently of the Organization, appeared to confirm this. 

Nevertheless, coinciding with the installation of the uni-polar world at the beginning of the 1990s, the OAS begins to adopt a series of instruments that effectively abolished pluralism in international relations, replacing it with “an irrevocable commitment to defence and the promotion of representative democracy and human rights in the region” in the notion where both concepts are accepted by the US government and the neo-liberal, pro-Yankee oligarchies of the region.  The “novelty” really signified a return to the most retrograde conceptions reflected in numerous instrument and declarations that, at their time, had been applied against Cuba and that had been reinforced and brought up to date, thus legally codifying political and economic concepts incumbent on the sovereign decisions of states and peoples, and concrete procedures were established to prevent a “breakdown of democratic organization”.  With this, the old intolerance of its origins was again “re-installed” in the OAS.

The so-called process of “revitalization” or “strengthening” of the Inter-American System today has, in these instruments, some of its principal “achievements”.  Among these we can underline: the so-called “Santiago Commitment” and Resolution 1080 of the General Assembly, both of them adopted in 1991; the Washington Protocol of 1992 and the so-called Democratic Charter, approved in September 2001.

Even though we cannot categorically affirm that this series of documents were designed expressly against Cuba, a country that, at the time of their adoption, had already gone though several decades excluded from the Inter-American System, their design armour-plated the OAS against an eventual return of Cuba, or it prevented the current members from following similar paths, under the risk of living with very serious consequences.

For example, in the “Santiago Commitment”, the ministers of foreign affairs meeting in that city moved forward the determination to “adopt an ensemble of efficacious, opportune and expeditious procedures that would ensure the promotion and defence of representative democracy”.

Resolution 1080 adopted by the General Assembly in June 1991, after indicating that “serious political, social and economic problems exist in the region that might threaten the stability of the democratic governments” resolved “to entrust to the Permanent Council that it draw up a group of proposals to motivate the preservation and strengthening of the democratic systems (…) This resolution adopteda procedure to react against the “breakdown of democratic order” by establishing the possibility of requesting the Secretary General to immediately call a meeting of the “Permanent Council in case events are produced that cause an abrupt or irregular interruption in the institutional democratic political process or the legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government in any of the Member States of the Organization (…)”

On December 14, 1992, in the XVI extraordinary period of sessions of the General Assembly the “Washington Protocol” was adopted, incorporating some amendments to the text of the OAS Charter.  Among these, the inclusion of a new Article 9 stands out; it established that “A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government is overthrown by force may be suspended from exercising their right of participation (…)” in the Inter-American System.  It went on to regulate the procedure to be applied when practices carried out to achieve “re-establishing representative democracy in an affected Member State” fail.  Finally, the affirmative vote of two-thirds of Member States was established, both for application of sanctions as well as for revoking of same.

Thirty years after the illegal exclusion of Cuba from the OAS – the text of the Charter in effect at that time did not contemplate any mechanism to do so, as was opportunely denounced by those who were opposed to that measure – that arbitrariness was assumed to be the source of law and the constitutive instrument of the Organization was reformed, establishing the suspension procedure for a Member State.

In September of 2001, the Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted in Lima; its Article 3 established as essential elements of representative democracy: “the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms: the access to power and its exercise subject to the state of law; the holding of regular, free, and just elections that are based on universal and secret suffrage as expression of the sovereignty of the people: the plural regime of political parties and organizations: and the separation and independence of public powers.”

In its Chapter IV entitled “Strengthening and preserving democratic institutionality”, in Articles 17 to 22, the Charter set the mechanism to determine the breakdown of “democratic order” and to proceed to the suspension of the State concerned, as well as its later re-insertion into the Inter-American System, according to the stipulation to that respect in the Organization Charter.

The “perfecting”, on a hemispheric level, of a group of interference norms were thus concluded and if these could indeed be used as dissuasive elements to confront possible coups d’état, they have been essentially called to avoid the rise to power of popular movements, to mediatize or hold up their procedure in coming to power and, eventually, exert pressure for their political resignation or immediate electoral defeat.  Basically, they serve to exercise US control over the continent.

An additional conclusion at which we may arrive is that those precepts are being “applied” at this time as part of the “common heritage” to be used in the scenario of “broad-based and constructive dialogue” to which they want to attract Cuba.  The then Secretary of State Colin Powell had already warned about that in 2001 during a speech before the plenary of the XXXIII OAS Assembly in Santiago de Chile, when he pointed out: “The Democratic Inter-American Charter says that the peoples of the Americas have the right to democracy.  It does not say that the peoples of America, with the exception of the people of Cuba, have the right to democracy”.

 

<< Back