FIGHTING TERRORISM AND WAR

Non-criminal legal rules adopted by different State agencies and institutions after 1 January 1959

 (a) Non-criminal legal rules adopted by the Central Bank of Cuba

Resolution No. 91 of 9 March 1997. This resolution provides for the application of "Guidelines for members of the national banking system relating to the detection and prevention of movements of illicit capital". All members of the national banking system are required to comply with the Guidelines, which empower the Auditor General to issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement and monitor compliance with them.

The Guidelines lay down a uniform set of rules that allow for common action to be taken throughout the entire financial sector so as to prevent the improper use of banking services. They also clearly define the specific responsibilities of financial institutions in this regard, with a view to preventing their services from being used for illicit purposes, especially money laundering transactions involving the proceeds of drug trafficking offences, tax evasion, etc. This set of rules must be observed by all members of the national banking system. Likewise, non-compliance or failure to follow suitable policies and procedures for dealing with money laundering is among the criteria applied in deciding whether to maintain or revoke the licences granted for conducting banking and financial activities in Cuba.

The Guidelines include the following sections:

 I. Basis and objectives of the Guidelines
 II. Definitions and stages of money laundering
 III. Policies, procedures and controls
 IV. Procedures for identifying money laundering activities
 V. Protecting information
 VI. Recognizing and reporting suspicious financial transactions
 VII. Cooperating with the authorities
 VIII. Training staff to comply with the rules set out above

An Appendix to the Guidelines explains how to identify suspicious money laundering activities relating to:

 A. Cash transactions
 B. Keeping an eye on clients
 C. Complex transactions and movements of funds

Resolution No. 27 of 7 December 1997. This resolution provides for creation of the Central Risk Information Office (CIR), which compiles and processes information on suspected or actual instances of money laundering.

The resolution requires all banks and non-bank financial institutions to report such information to CIR on a monthly basis.

 Instruction No. 1 of 20 February 1998, signed by the Auditor General of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC). This instruction supplements the implementation and monitoring measures set forth in the Guidelines, and outlines 19 steps to be followed, bearing in mind the special characteristics of the institution concerned, as follows:

Know the client. The "know your clients" policy is primarily designed to enable financial institutions to predict with a fair degree of certainty what type of transaction the client intends to carry out.

Identify the client. Outlines procedures to be followed in order to determine the true identity of clients and their activities when opening accounts for them or providing some other service.

Obtain valid client references. Stresses the importance of obtaining information, from reliable sources, on the client's banking record, coordinating procedures as necessary in order to verify the identity and activities of the client.

Transactions with companies. Company accounts are the vehicles most likely to be used in money laundering, especially when the front used is a legally established business. It is therefore important to ascertain who are the directors and the staff members having the power to sign legal documents, as well as what type of business is involved and the history of the company.

Opening and management of accounts according to type of account. Employees whose duties include the opening of accounts should receive training on the verification procedures required in that process. In order to be able to discover unusual transactions, a procedure should be developed for reviewing account movements.

Cash deposits and withdrawals. A system should be established for monitoring situations when high-denomination bills are received or paid out and when large cash transfers are made to other financial institutions.

Loans guaranteed by deposits. Banks must be especially careful with loan transactions which are guaranteed by deposits in other institutions within or outside the country.

Payment instruments. Banks must be especially careful about accepting checks that have several endorsements when the identity of the primary payee is unknown or cannot be verified. The same care should be taken with groups of payment authorizations or bank drafts, postal money orders, travellers' cheques, cashier's cheques or other payment instruments.

Transactions with securities. Banks must pay special attention to the potential for the laundering of assets through transactions involving securities.

Numbered accounts. Where such accounts exist, banks are instructed to comply with rules relating to identification and familiarity with the client, client references and account management.

Safe deposit boxes. Precautions must be taken when dealing with requests for safe deposit boxes and other types of custodial services, since boxes can be used to deposit money, securities and other assets obtained by unlawful means.

Transfers. When repeated transfers are made or they involve high amounts, and the bank is not able to verify on its own the legitimacy of the source of funds, the issuing bank should be asked to supply information on the identity and activities of the client.

Familiarity with employees. Banks must keep an eye on their employees, especially those in positions involving contact with clients, handling money and record-keeping. Suitable rules and controls must be applied.

Training staff to comply with rules. Staff should receive training regularly in connection with institutional procedures for the application of mechanisms, controls and legal obligations.

Evaluating compliance with rules. The auditing system should make it possible to ensure compliance with the rules and to conduct regular evaluations, so as to review all relevant aspects.

Administrative and legal liability of directors, officials and general staff for non-compliance with rules. All staff concerned should be fully aware of the policies and procedures they should follow in order to prevent money laundering. They should understand the criminal liability they would incur should the institution's services be used for money laundering.

Identification of suspected money laundering transactions and application of internal measures in the bank. Those concerned must be familiar enough with the client's business dealings to recognize any unusual transaction or series of transactions.

Prevention Compliance Official. Every financial institution has a designated official who reports to the top executive of the institution. This official is responsible for identifying and taking such steps as may be necessary in connection with suspected money laundering activities, whether he or she discovers them or they are reported to him or her by the staff. This official must collaborate and report to the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and the Central Risk Information Office (CIR) of the Bank Oversight Office of the Central Bank of Cuba.

This official must also take into account the existing regulations on bank secrecy and the delivery of documents that have been or may be issued by the institution or by the Central Bank of Cuba.

This official has the following duties:

 · Draws up policies, programmes or instructions on the prevention of money laundering.
 · Compiles documentation on money laundering.
 · Detects suspected money laundering activities proposed to the financial institution.
 · Prepares reports for management.
 · Supervises the work of other employees carrying out prevention-related duties.
 · Reviews compliance with the institution's rules on prevention.
 · Applies within the institution prevention-related measures developed as a result of situations in other institutions.
 · Prepares reports on suspicious transactions which the institutions are required to submit to the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and the Central Risk Information Office (CIR) of the Bank Oversight Office of the Central Bank of Cuba.

Useful reports for identifying suspected money laundering transactions and cooperating with the judicial authorities

Financial institutions are required to set up adequate controls and records for gathering information on all suspicious transactions. These records are then submitted to the auditors, the Bank Oversight Office of the Central Bank of Cuba and other officials concerned with such activities.

Instruction No. 2 of 26 April 2000, signed by the Auditor General of the Central Bank of Cuba. This instruction supplements the implementation and monitoring measures set forth in the Guidelines, and is applicable specifically to illicit activities involving collections and payments within the national territory, including the following:

 1. Withdrawals of money for payroll or other items not covered by the stipulated terms, in greater amounts and/or more frequently than usual.
 2. Transactions that have no relationship with the company's normal activity.
 3. Cash withdrawals by persons other than those who normally make withdrawals, even though they may appear to be authorized.
 4. Relationships with individuals who have nothing to do with the company's normal operations.

 (b) Non-criminal rules adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Institute of Cuba

Bilateral agreements against acts of unlawful interference (hijacking of aircraft) were signed with Venezuela, Canada, Colombia and Mexico.

An agreement was signed with the United States (1973) which was denounced in 1976, following the sabotage of a Cubana Airlines aircraft off the coast of Barbados.

On 28 September 1998, Cuba ratified article 3(bis) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, in which the contracting States agree not to use civil aviation improperly and recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. (The article entered into effect on 1 October 1998).

On 12 February 2001, Cuba ratified the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo in 1963.

As a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and a signatory of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Cuba complies with the standards and practices recommended by ICAO and with annex 17 to the Convention, on safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.

Resolution DJ 2/99 provided for the application of the National Regulations on the Safety and Protection of Civil Aviation, which establishes standards for the safety and protection of civil aviation.

 (c) Non-criminal rules adopted by the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA) in the chemical, biological and nuclear spheres

 I. Chemical sphere

Cuba signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, on 13 January 1993. The instrument of ratification was deposited on 29 April 1997.

 A. Rules for the application in Cuba of the Convention on Chemical Weapons

Decision 3150/97, Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers: decision to ratify the Convention.

Resolution 52, National Statistical Office: amends the nomenclature of the Harmonized Product Classification System, adding secondary headings corresponding to the chemical substances listed in the Convention.

Decree-Law 202/99 (24/12/99) on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. This decree-law lays down the rules for complying with the obligations Cuba has undertaken as a State Party to the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

This Decree-Law includes the following provisions:

 · The Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment is designated as the National Authority under the Convention.
 · An executive centre is set up to carry out the responsibilities assigned to the Ministry as National Authority, in accordance with this Decree-Law.
 · A national system is established to implement controls in respect of the chemical substances covered by the Convention.
 · Regulations for national and international inspections under the Convention are drawn up.

Prohibitions applying to individuals or companies in the national territory or under the jurisdiction of the Cuban State are spelled out.

Resolution 35/98, CITMA: Creates the Executive Centre of the National Authority on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In addition, a number of legal rules to supplement Decree-Law 202 are currently under review. These include regulations pertaining to national and international inspections and regulations on the granting of licences and permits, the application of controls on chemical substances as mandated by the Convention, and the handling of information.

 B. Other national rules in the chemical sphere:

 · Decree-Law No. 107/88. Controls on industrial explosives. Munitions and explosive or toxic chemical substances.
 · Decree-Law No. 154/94. Regulations for controlling industrial explosives. Munitions and explosive or toxic chemical substances.
 · Resolution No. 268/90, Ministry of Public Health (MINSAP). Prohibits the entry into the country of certain pesticides and chemicals.
 · Resolution No. 181/95, MINSAP. Prohibits the entry of certain pesticides and chemicals.
 · Resolution No. 1/96, Ministry of Transport (MITRANS) - Ministry of the Interior (MININT). Regulations for the transport of industrial explosives. Munitions and explosive or toxic chemical substances.
 · Resolution No. 159/95, CITMA. National Registry of Information on Toxic Chemical Products. Reporting and prior consent procedures in respect of industrial chemicals.
 · Resolution No. 67/96, MINSAP. Regulations for controlling precursors of basic or essential chemical substances.
 · Resolution No. 1/98, MININT. Regulations for using halogenated fire-fighting substances.
 · Resolution No. 87/99, CITMA. Establishes requirements for the transport, storage and destruction of dangerous substances. Repeals CITMA resolution No. 15/96.
 · Resolution No. 53/2000, CITMA. Completes the listing of hazardous waste mentioned in CITMA resolution 87/99.
 · Resolution No. 67/96, MINSAP. Regulations for controlling precursors of chemical substances.

 II. Biological sphere

Biosafety activities in Cuba were begun in 1984 and were taken to the institutional level in 1993. They were further enhanced in 1996 with the creation of the National Biological Safety Centre (CNSB) as part of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA). As a central State agency, CITMA is responsible - under Law 81, on the Environment - for proposing and implementing national policy in the area of biological safety.

Cuba is a Party to the following international instruments in the biological sphere:

 · Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons. Signed in 1972 and ratified in 1976.
 · Convention on Biological Diversity. Signed in 1992 and ratified in 1994.
Our country is currently in the process of ratifying the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, signed in May 2000, which supplements the Convention on Biological Diversity.

In the framework of the Convention on Biological Weapons, Cuba has participated since 1992 in data exchanges by submitting confidence-building forms every year. In these, it reports on the activities of the following national institutions:

 · Civil Defence Laboratory (because it is a BL-3 containment laboratory).
 · Centre for Laboratory Animals (CENPALAB) (BL-3 containment laboratories and production of vaccines for animals).
 · Pedro Kouri Institute for Tropical Medicine (because it participates in the development of vaccines and has a BL-3 containment laboratory).
 · Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Centre (because it conducts genetic manipulation, has BL-3 containment laboratories and produces vaccines).
 · National Centre for Biological Preparations (BIOCEN) (vaccine production).
 · Pharmaceutical Laboratory (LABIOFAM) (vaccine production).
 · Directorate for Hygiene and Epidemiology, MINSAP (to report on outbreaks in humans).
 · Veterinary Medicine Institute (to report on outbreak in animals).
 · Directorate for Plant Health (to report on outbreaks of diseases and appearance of pests).
 · Finlay Institute (vaccine production).
 · National Animal Health Centre (production of veterinary vaccines).
 · Carlos J. Finlay biological products company (production of vaccines for humans and for animals).

Domestic legislation currently in force:

Resolution No. 67/96, CITMA. Sets up the National Biosafety Centre (CNSB) to organize, direct, execute, supervise and monitor the National Biosafety System, and to organize, direct and monitor measures for complying with the obligations undertaken by the country as a party to international legal instruments in this field.

Decree-Law No. 190, on Biosafety, of 28 January 1999. The main instrument in the sphere of biological safety. Establishes broad principles for organizing activities in this field.
Resolution No. 42 (1999), CITMA. Official list of biological agents that affect humans, animals and plants. Classifies risk groups and provides the basis for determining safety risks involved in handling them.

Resolution No. 8 (2000), CITMA. General biosafety rules for facilities that handle biological agents and related products, organisms and fragments containing genetic information. Establishes principles for organizing biosafety in facilities.

Resolution No. 76. Regulations for granting biosafety licenses. Lays down requirements for submitting applications and for the granting of licences and permits relating to biosafety.

Work is currently underway on the drafting of other regulations that will complete the legislative pyramid, including regulations on accounting and on the control of biological agents.

 III. Nuclear sphere

Cuba has been a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1957.

Cuba has been a Party to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material since 26 October 1997.

Cuba has had a nuclear programme since the late 1970s. As part of that programme and to demonstrate its peaceful nature, in 1980 Cuba signed IAEA safeguards agreements for each of its nuclear facilities, as follows: INFCIRC/281, for the Juraguá nuclear plant; INFCIRC/298, for the research reactor, and INFCIRC/311 for the zero power reactor (ZPR).

The second of the above agreements was cancelled in May 2001, as the project was ended.
Since 1992, yearly safeguards inspections have been conducted by IAEA inspectors. Inspectors from the National Nuclear Safety Centre (CNSN) also conduct annual inspections of those facilities that are subject to safeguards. In all cases, the inspections conducted by both IAEA and CNSN have not shown any deviation from the Agreements.

Cuba signed the Protocol Additional to Nuclear Safeguards Agreements in October 1999, becoming the first country - and so far, the only one - to have partial safeguards agreements. This has definitely represented a step forward towards strengthening the safeguards programme and hence, the prestige of the IAEA verification mechanism.

In March 1995, Cuba signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), in which Latin America and the Caribbean are declared to be free from nuclear weapons.

Domestic legislation currently in force:

Decree-Law No. 207 (14/2/2000), on the use of nuclear energy. Repeals the earlier Decree-Law No. 56 (1982), the first set of basic legal rules for the proper use of nuclear energy. This decree-law takes into account the importance of safeguards, as well as of related measures and controls to be applied through the National System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SNCC).

This system focuses on granting licences and permits, as well as for accounting, controls and enforcement. SNCC inspectors have absolute authority. In cases of unauthorized use of nuclear materials or violations of accounting practices and other controls, if the management of the facility does not take corrective measures straightaway, an order to stop all operations with nuclear materials immediately is issued. This legislation also includes an appeals mechanism.

Resolution No. 1/96, CITMA. Creates the National Nuclear Safety Centre to oversee the implementation of SNCC.

Decree No. 208 (24/5/96). Lays out the general provisions governing the National System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SNCC).

Resolution No. 62/92 (12/7/96). Regulations on Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material. Establishes rules for SNCC.
(d) Other rules and measures adopted in recent years by different national agencies and institutions to strengthen the country's anti-terrorist systems

The constant terrorist threat Cuba has lived under for the last 40 years has forced it to continually enhance the anti-terrorist system. Thus, measures have been taken to adjust the system to the prevailing situation and to the specific characteristics of terrorist actions and acts carried out against our people and our territory.

Following are some of the most important measures adopted during the last five years.

Strengthening of discovery systems at borders (ports, airports, tourist marinas and coast)

An in-depth study was made of the weak spots on our borders, and a plan was drawn up to strengthen them. State funding requirements amounted to several million dollars.

 · An centralized command mechanism was set up at the main international airports so as to guarantee consistency in the operations of the different bodies concerned with the borders.
 · Staff and communications services of groups operating on the borders were increased.
 · Explosives-detection equipment was purchased, and filming and x-ray capabilities at border crossings were improved.
 · The availability and use of dogs trained to detect explosives was increased.
 · Cuban personnel abroad who work with air and maritime operations were instructed on how to detect signs of terrorist activity.
 · Specialized training was provided to crew of aircraft travelling abroad, as well as to staff at the country's airports. On some occasions, when justified by the operational situation, specialists in explosives or operational techniques were added to the crews.
 · The capacity to monitor suspicious individuals from the moment they enter the airport terminal was strengthened.
 · Discovery systems were set up at border points in the main international marinas.
 · Security and protection systems on the coastlines were strengthened.
 · Patrolling capacity and protection of troops along the borders were strengthened.
 · Security, protection and monitoring systems at tourist facilities and at the main economic sites of the country were reorganized.
 · An agency (TEDAX) specializing in the detection and deactivation of explosives was created.
 · A methodology for dealing with terrorist acts or the discovery of explosive devices was developed and disseminated among the professional forces.
 · Priority was giving to training personnel involved in discovery activities. Evidence charts were drawn up, the procedures to be followed in discovery operations were demonstrated, and staff were instructed on how to use sophisticated explosives-detection equipment.